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Abstract— Smartphone carrier companies rely on mobile
networks for keeping an accurate record of customer data usage
for billing purposes. In this paper, we present a vulnerability
that allows an attacker to force the victim’s smartphone to
consume data through the cellular network by starting the
data download on the victim’s cell phone without the victim’s
knowledge. The attack is based on switching the victim’s
smartphones from the Wi-Fi network to the cellular network
while downloading a large data file. This attack has been
implemented in real-life scenarios where the test’s outcomes
demonstrate that the attack is feasible and that mobile networks
do not record customer data usage accurately.
Index Terms— WiFi Security; Evil Twin Attack; Man in
the Middle Attack; Deauthentication Attack; Captive Portal;
Mobile Data Consumption.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cell phones are becoming a necessary piece of equipment
in our lives. In 2016, there were seven billion active cellular
telephone subscriptions worldwide with three and half billion
cell phones that have a subscription to access the Internet
[1]. To reduce congestion on the cellular network, most cell
phone ISP carriers throttle customer data after exceeding a
certain data limit or impose a monthly limit data cap.
On the other hand, as a complementary service, coffee
shops, fast food restaurants, and airports provide free Wi-
Fi network access to their customers. These open access
networks provide budget-friendly Internet access which helps
offload data traffic from the cellular network [2][3]. However,
for their ease of access, these types of networks are insecure
in terms of lacking authentication and encryption. Instead,
when the customer first accesses the Wi-Fi network, he or she
must agree to the Public Wi-Fi Terms and Conditions, where
the ISP provider claims no responsibility for the customer
information security/privacy [4].
The absence of wireless security in open access Wi-
Fi networks provides tempting environments for attackers
[5][6][7][8]. An Evil Twin Attack (ETA) can be initiated by
an attacker to impersonate the role of a legitimate Wi-Fi
access point (illustrated in Fig. 1). Such an impersonation is
simple since an open Wi-Fi network can only be recognized
by its MAC address and Service Set Identifier (SSID). Fur-
thermore, the attacker’s fake access point (AP) may provide
a better and more powerful signal to the victim in which case
it will cause the victim to connect to the attacker’s network
Fig. 1. Illustration of an Evil Twin Attack . The attacker can successfully
lure a victim into connecting to a fake access point instead of the legitimate
access point when it provides a stronger/better signal to those customers.
instead of the legitimate network. Such a switch is automatic
and can happen without the victim’s intervention [9].
After the victim connects to the attacker’s AP, the attacker
can snoop the victim’s wireless data and apply a Man In
The Middle Attacks (MIMA). For example, DNS spoofing
attack [10] is a popular MIMA that allows the attacker to
response to DNS query coming from the victim. The attack
can redirect the victim web browser to a malicious website
rather than the legitimate one by sending her a wrong IP
address.
In this paper, we improved wireless network security by:
• Introducing a new vulnerability that depletes customer
mobile data quota. The attack targets customers that use
free open Wi-Fi networks instead of their cellular data
connection.
• Our proposed attack was implemented and evaluated in
a real-life environment.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses re-
lated works. The design of the new mobile data consumption
attack is presented in Section III. Then, our attack results are
shown in Section IV. Finally, we present our conclusions in
section V. Throughout the paper, we refer to the attacker as
an individual or group of individuals.
II. RELATED WORK
A mobile data consumption attack can drain a victim’s
data cap in a short period of time. Such an attack can prevent
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the victim from accessing the Internet after reaching his or
her monthly allocated data limit, which leads to denial of
service. If the victim does not have a data cap, he or she
will be continuously charged for the data used by the attack.
Also, keeping the mobile device transmitting/receiving data
results in battery power consumption.
Stealth spam attacks can abuse the fact that many connec-
tions that are formed do not tell the network that they are
closing [11]. Thus an attacker can use a connection made by
the victim that the network still thinks is open, even though
the phone had closed it. The attacker can then send data
over this connection as a spam attack, which consumes the
victim’s data.
Other similar attacks are introduced in [12]. The first is the
cloak-and-dagger spamming attack where the victim’s data
is consumed by either spoofing the victim’s IP address and
using data as the victim, or by sending an MMS message
which opens up a connection to spam the victim over, using
up the victim’s data. The second attack in [12] is the hit-
but-no-touch attack where data packets are sent to the victim
with a shortened time-to-live value. The packets then pass
through a mobile network’s billing system, but never make
it to the victim, thus invisibly using the victim’s data.
Mobile billing vulnerability based on TCP packet re-
transmission is presented in [8]. Many mobile service
providers, such as AT&T, Verizon, T-Mobile, and Sprint, bill
customers based on the total amount of data traffic that has
been sent and received to the Internet, including retransmitted
data packets. An attacker can force the victim to consume
more data by increasing the number of TCP data packets
retransmitted.
The attacker sends a text message to the victim with a
link to a malicious server. When the victim opens the link,
a TCP connection between the victim’s cell phone and the
remote server will be established. The connection is based
on TCP protocol, and thus it can keep forcing the victim to
retransmit TCP packets. TCP packet retransmission can be
initiated when three acknowledgment packets were received
to the same TCP sequence number or by the timeout of the
TCP connection.
A similar attack on a mobile billing system is when the
attacker sends a spoofed IP packet to an external server [13].
The remote server uses the victim’s spoofed IP address to
start a network connection to the victim’s cell phone. The
remote server then sends a large amount of data to the mobile
network that will be directed to the victim cell phone.
All the previous attacks targeted victims that use a private
IP address. The impact of these attacks can be intensified
when the victim is using a public IP address [14]. With the
spread of IPv6, cell phone devices will have direct access to
the Internet. In this situation, the attacker can directly send
data packets to the victim that deplete cell phone data quota.
In this paper, we present a new attack that exploits the
inaccuracy of mobile network billing systems.
Fig. 2. A common Starbucks captive portal with an injected malicious
script. Once this page opens, a download begins in the victim’s smartphone’s
background.
III. PROPOSED MOBILE DATA CONSUMPTION ATTACK
A. Preliminaries
Here are the terms we use throughout the paper:
• Attacker: the individual or group of individuals carry-
ing out the attack and the attacker’s equipment used,
such as a laptop and software.
• Victim: the individual that is being attacked and the
device that is being attacked, such as the victim’s
smartphone.
• Captive Portal: a web page that network users are
redirected to in order to accept these network usage
conditions or similar terms. They are often used in
coffee shops, fast food restaurants, and airports. They
can be seen directly after a user connects to the network,
as the user will be redirected to the captive portal upon
attempting to use the Internet. If the customer doesn’t
accept the terms and conditions on the captive portal, he
or she will be denied Internet access to the free Wi-Fi
network.
Our mobile data consumption attack is designed for use
where there is a nearby public Wi-Fi hotspot, such as a coffee
shop, hotel, fast food restaurant, or store that has a captive
portal. The attacker can target a victim or set of victims at the
Wi-Fi network. If the attacker targeted a particular victim,
the attacker could wait until the victim enters an area with
a nearby public Wi-Fi hotspot.
In the current version of the attack, any customer con-
nected to the open Wi-Fi network is a potential target for
our proposed attack. However, not every person will be
attacked. This work focuses on attacking one victim, as
attacking a set of victims requires running the attack multiple
times, once on each victim. Selecting the victim or setting
up the attack can happen in either order. If the attacker
Fig. 3. The overlay displayed by the malicious script. The loading bar
moves to 100% using a logarithmic progression designed to keep the victim
on the page so that the attacker can perform the attack.
chooses to attack an individual that happens to be at the
location, it is recommended that the attacker sets up the
attack before choosing a random victim. If the attacker has
prior knowledge of a particular victim’s plan to go to a
certain location, the attacker can setup the attack before the
victim arrives. Having the attack setup before the victim
arrives or before the victim is chosen increases the chance
of the attack’s success.
B. Design
The proposed attack in this paper is designed based on the
following three attacks:
• The attacker creates a fake web server that serves a
captive portal web page that is similar to the original
Wi-Fi network. The captive portal web page includes
a malicious code that forces the victim to download a
large data file from the Internet.
• Using an Evil Twin Attack, the attacker lures the victim
to switch to the fake network. Such a switch can
also happen in an automatic manner especially when
the attacker AP is near to the victim’s location. After
the victim connects to the fake network, the attacker
can spoof the victim’s DNS request by sending the
malicious captive portal web page whenever the victim
requests an URL.
• To make sure the victim is only downloading data
through the cellular network, deauthentication attacks
target the victim’s smartphone preventing him or her
from connection to any Wi-Fi network after the captive
portal is delivered. Deauthentication is easy to im-
plement because 802.11 WLAN management wireless
frames are sent without any protection [15].
Fig. 4. The captive portal after the loading bar finishes. When the victim
clicks on the page, the victim is redirected to her desired URL, but this
page is left open in another tab, downloading in the background.
C. Implementation
A laptop with an off-shelf network interface card is used
in our attack proposal. Linux operating system was used to
implement all the attacks illustrated in the design section.
First, the attacker starts an Evil Twin Attack on the victim.
We can predict which open Wi-Fi network the victim is
connected to, based on his or her current location. For
instance, if the victim is in a coffee shop, it is likely that the
victim is connected to the coffee shop’s public Wi-Fi. The
attacker must connect to the open Wi-Fi network beforehand
and capture the captive portal used on the network. A captive
portal can be captured by connecting to the original Wi-Fi
network and accessing the Internet using a free web browser,
such as Chrome. The original Wi-Fi network sends the
captive portal web page to the attacker which is downloaded
and used to create the malicious captive portal.
Not every captive portal that is downloaded will be dis-
played to the victim exactly the way it appears on the Wi-Fi.
Because of this, the attacker may have to manually adjust the
captive portal’s code in order to make the downloaded captive
portal look very similar to the original captive portal. The
closer the downloaded captive portal looks to the original,
the better the chance is that a victim will not notice that the
downloaded captive portal is not the original one.
Once a downloaded copy of the captive portal is obtained,
the attacker needs to inject malicious code into the captive
portal. The code has been written for this attack, and it
can be injected into most captive portals without altering
the integrity of the web page. The code does not change
how a captive portal looks. However, the new malicious
captive portal adds functionality that causes the web page
to download data in the background. Functionality is also
added that causes the web page to display an overlay upon
clicking the button on the captive portal that allows a user
to connect to the network.
The overlay is designed to give time for the attacker to
conduct the attack while attempting to keep the victim on
the captive portal and not realize that the attack is occurring.
Also, the captive portal is designed to cause the victim to
leave the web page open for an extended period of time by
redirecting the victim away from the captive portal, leaving
it open and downloading in another tab. The code has also
been designed to bypass most pop-up blockers which are
built into smartphone browsers. An example of a malicious
captive portal is shown in Figure 2 along with examples of
the overlay shown in Figure 3 and Figure 4.
IV. RESULTS
After the malicious captive portal is implemented, the
attacker is ready to start our proposed attack. The attacker
will begin the mobile data consumption attack by initiating
an Evil Twin Attack [5][6] in which the attacker’s laptop Wi-
Fi impersonates the original access point that the victim is
connected to. The program Airedump-ng can be used to find
information about the AP the victim is connected to, such as
the AP’s MAC address and the AP’s channel. The program
Airemon-ng [16] can be used to mount the attacker’s laptop
wireless card into monitor mode to prepare the card to be
used as an AP. The program Airebase-ng [16] can then be
used to make the card work as an AP with the same MAC
address and name of the public AP. The attacker should now
have a replica of the public AP running on his or her laptop.
The attacker also needs to start up a DHCP server, DNS
proxy, and host the malicious captive portal on his or her
laptop. A DHCP server can be set up using the program
ISC-DHCP-Server [17]. The server hands out IP addresses
to the victim. The network configuration sent by the DHCP
server needs to match the one sent by the legitimate Wi-
Fi network exactly. A DNS proxy is set up by using the
DnsChef software [18]. A DNS proxy is needed to resolve
URL requests of the victim to the IP address of the attacker’s
captive portal by applying a DNS spoofing attack. The
Apache web server [19] is used to host the captive portal
on the attacker’s laptop.
If the victim is already connected to the public Wi-
Fi, the attacker can disconnect him or her by initiating a
deauthentication attack. This is done by sending continuous
deauthentication packets. The program Aireplay-ng [16] is
used to send out these packets. The packets are sent to the
victim and the AP of the victim. The packets going to the
victim are spoofed as the AP and notify the victim that
the AP wants him or her to disconnect from the AP. The
packets are also sent to the AP informing it that the victim
is disconnecting from the AP. Thus the victim and the AP
both disconnect from each other. These packets can target
a particular individual if the attacker has the MAC address
of the victim, or it can disconnect every individual from the
AP.
Once the victim is disconnected from the AP, he or
she would start searching for another AP from the same
WiFi network to connect to. As long as the victim has not
Fig. 5. A diagram displaying how the attacker establishes connection with
the victim.
Fig. 6. A diagram displaying how the attacker begins consuming data from
the victim.
previously connected to any other nearby network, and as
long as the attacker’s AP has a stronger signal than the
public AP, the victim will connect to the attacker’s fake AP.
The attacker can power up their wireless card in order to
increase the signal strength of their AP to attract the victim.
The attacker can also move closer to the victim in order to
increase signal strength. Figure 5 illustrates how the attacker
establishes a connection with the victim.
Once the victim connects to the attacker’s network, the
victim will send an URL request to access a particular
website. The attacker DNS proxy would capture the URL
request and resolve the request to the IP address of the
attacker’s captive portal. The victim then requests the IP
address which happens to be the malicious captive portal
of the attacker. The attacker sends back the captive portal as
a response to the victim’s request. This is a typical MIMA
of the wireless victim.
The victim’s browser loads the captive portal and imme-
diately starts trying to download data through the attacker.
However, the attacker would not have a connection to the
internet, and therefore nothing is yet downloaded by the
victim. The victim is expected to click the button on the
captive portal that allows a user to connect to the network.
Once the victim has clicked the the Public Wi-Fi Terms
and Conditions accept button, the attacker disconnects the
victim from the Evil Twin Attack access point. This can be
done by simply turning off Airebase-ng. The victim now
has no nearby networks to connect to, as the attacker begins
sending out deauthentication packets as needed to keep the
victim from reconnecting to the public AP. With no nearby
network to connect to, the victim will switch by default to
the mobile data network. The mobile network grants Internet
access to the victim and the captive portal. The captive portal
now has a connection to download data using the victim’s
cell phone data plan. At this point, our proposed attack is
consuming data from the victim as shown in Figure 6.
A laptop and online security auditing tools are used in
implementing our attack. The attack does not require any
modification to a protocol or device firmware. The current
implementation of the attack redirects users to a malicious
captive portal by poisoning DNS requests.
The attack was tested using two smartphones running An-
droid 6. Both phones used the browser Chrome app to open
the captive portal. The rate of the mobile data consumption
from the attack varies from one device to another. It also
depends on the type of data plan the victim is using. For
example, if the victim is enrolled in a high-speed cellular
data plan, he or she will consume more data than a slow
speed data plan. Other variables to the rate of mobile data
consumption include how fast the server pushing data out
to the device can do so, and how good of a connection
the device has to it’s local mobile tower. However, our
tests demonstrated that the rate of mobile data consumption
was often high enough to cause a severe amount of data
consumption.
Our attack can run on a victim’s mobile device for an
extended time, which will most likely cause a severe amount
of data consumption. The attack exploits a vulnerability in
the mobile networks’ data usage billing system that allows
an attacker to cause serious data depletion of customer data
quota. Our tests demonstrate that the proposed attack is
feasible when a victim connects to a free open Wi-Fi network
offered by coffee shops, fast food restaurants, and airports.
The attack will keep going as long as the victim does not
stop the cellular data connection.
However, the victim may notice that she is not using the
Wi-Fi network in two different ways. First, a pop-up message
that says Wi-Fi disconnected may appear at the bottom of
the screen for about a second. Second, an indicator at the top
of the screen will show that there is no Wi-Fi connection and
that mobile data is being used. The attack attempts to cover
indicators through social engineering by showing different
messages through the malicious captive portal.
Furthermore, our attack can be only implemented when
the victim is connected to an open Wi-Fi network. If the
customer is connected to a secure Wi-Fi network that uses
WEP/WPA/WPA2, our attack will fail. The attacker will not
be able to start an Evil Twin Attack because he or she does
not have the wireless network encryption key. Furthermore,
the attack may fail when the customer can detect an Evil
Twin Attack [5][6].
V. CONCLUSIONS
A vulnerability in the mobile networks’ data usage billing
system was demonstrated by using a mobile data consump-
tion attack. The attack works by delivering a malicious
captive portal to the victim, forcing them to connect to
their mobile data plan, and causing them to use data via
a download initiated by the captive portal. Our attack would
work when the victim connects to a free open Wi-Fi network
that is available in most coffee shops, fast food restaurants,
and airports.
Our attack evaluation was based on attacking the victim for
short period of time, using Android mobile OS and Chrome
web browser. Further testing is needed to explore the extent
of the proposed vulnerability. For example, initiating our
attack on different mobile OS and various web browsers.
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